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Introduction 
The Allied record in Normandy is irritating simply because we know we could have done 
better. The extensive casualty rates to infantry 
and armour nearly exhausted American arms 
and created a political crisis in Canada. The 
dazzling success of American armour during 
"Cobra's" pu r su i t eclipsed the Canadian 
armoured battles of August, despite the fact that 
the vast majority of Allied tank casualties from 
direct gunfire engagements occurred in II 
Canadian Corps. The exultation of operation 
manoeuvre, the closing of the Falaise Gap and 
the liberation of Paris obfuscated the reality of 
tactical deficiency. It required three bloody 
months and seven major operations to drive the 
Germans out of Normandy. This occurred 
despite total air supremacy and a strategical 
numerical advantage. The reasons for tactical 
frustration are technical, geographical, and 
primarily, doctrinal. 
Second Canadian Corps has long been 
deprived of critical operational analysis. This 
is perhaps because the technical complexities 
of a rmoured warfare at the tactical and 
opera t ional level general ly are not well 
understood. Canadian armour fought tank 
bat t les th roughou t Operat ions "Spring," 
"Totalize," and "Tractable," but it did not 
maneuver . C a n a d i a n a r m o u r ' s g rea tes t 
opportunity for strategic victory occurred in 
Normandy. It is appropriate that an armoured 
officer review these matters, pick up the thrown 
gauntlet and attempt to explain the armoured 
battlefield as it related to Operation "Totalize." 
"Totalize" - The Plan 
Totalize" was to be the last great offensive 
in the Normandy Campaign. It was 
General B.L. Montgomery's final opportunity 
to wrest personal victory and publicity from 
General Omar Bradley. The presence of the 
heavy bombers sealed the contract; it was all 
or nothing. "Totalize" was First Canadian Army 
commander Harry Crerar's first "Army" battle 
and he may have been nervous about it. The 
weight could not have been all that heavy since 
he turned everything over to General G.G. 
Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps. 
"Totalize" was a grand corps battle, as II 
Canadian Corps controlled almost every 
resource available to First Canadian Army. If 
there was any pressure, the lion's share fell on 
Simonds's shoulders. He decided that the 
Germans were not going to be surprised as to 
the location and direction of the offensive, but 
he was capable of perplexing them "in respect 
to time and method."1 It has been suggested2 
that ULTRA briefings from the Signals Liaison 
Unit attached to First Canadian Army HQ 
convinced S imonds t h a t 1st SS LAH 
(Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler) Panzer Division was 
still south of Verrières and dug in astride the 
main Falaise highway on the high ground near 
Cintheaux. Certainly Simonds was unique as 
the only Allied Corps commander in Normandy 
cleared for ULTRA d i s semina t ion 3 b u t 
intelligence interpretation would have been 
stretched to report the Leibstandarte's presence 
south of Caen. 
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Simonds's own Intelligence Staff concluded 
that 89th Infantry Division had relieved 1st SS 
LAH but "estimated that 1 SS Pz had left one 
anti-tank battalion deployed on the front."4 An 
initial report admitted that the whereabouts of 
1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions was not 
so clear but subsequent intelligence made things 
clearer: "On 7 August news was received that 
large amounts of 1 SS and at least a battlegroup 
of 12 SS were fighting further West at VASSY 
and the FORET DE GRIMBOSQ respectively."5 
This suggests that Simonds, rather than being 
influenced by ULTRA and his own Intelligence 
resources , chose to ignore most recent 
information and s tuck to his original 
appreciation, written on 1 August wherein he 
concluded, mostly based on "Spring" analysis 
that: "The position [May-sur-Orne to Tilly and 
south to Hautmesnil] is at present manned by 1 
SS Right and 9 SS Left."6 Faced with the latest 
ULTRA updates as well as his own Intelligence 
Summaries, Simonds was clearly not prepared 
to revise his estimate at this late date. He may 
have been overtaken by events. 
Neo-Classical Testudos -
Evolution of the Simonds Doctrine 
General Simonds decided to launch another frontal attack.7 As there was little option 
for maneuver before breakout, Simonds settled 
on technique. "Totalize" is often used to show 
Simonds's creative mind at its best. It is 
sometimes used to demonstrate his genius for 
planning and his gunner's precision. Simonds 
crafted a plan of attack unlike any other. Again 
he decided to go at night. Again he used artificial 
moonlight. Now came the changes, and they were 
doctrinally astounding. Armour was to lead. The 
spearhead of this night attack was not going to 
be infantry but a meat grinder of armoured 
columns. He drew up two armoured Testudos 
before the startline which consisted of an 
intricate parade of navigation tanks, mine-
clearing flail tanks, armoured bulldozers, flame-
throwing Churchills, and main battle tanks8 in 
very cavalry columns of fours. These were 
followed by "Simonds' APCs," Priest self-
propel led g u n s conver ted to a r m o u r e d 
personnel carriers (Kangaroos) at the Corps 
Commander's request.9 Each armoured group 
was packed closer than Piccadilly Circus at rush 
hour. One officer recalls, "I left my tank and 
20 
walked back to the end of the regimental 
column, we were closed so tight that my feet 
never touched the ground, I just stepped from 
tank to tank."10 
The attack was to advance on compass 
bearing while flails and dozers cleared the 
ground of mines. To ensure direction was 
ma in t a ined , S imonds had Bofors g u n s 
deployed on either side of the columns firing 
tracers down the axis of advance. Batteries of 
giant anti-aircraft search lights were used for 
both artificial moonlight as well as long 
distance beams that were fixed over the distant 
objective and served as a surreal guide. The 
Corps Signals Regiment set up radio homing 
beacons to guide the tank commanders.11 
This grand march was supported by attacks 
by heavy bombers designed to obliterate the 
towns that eluded capture during "Atlantic" 
and "Spring." "Totalize" was an extraordinary 
offensive, of such Cecil B. DeMille epic 
proportions that it overwhelmed senior officers 
in briefings: 
I well recall his "O" Group before "Totalize" 
when the several dlv comds sat in a circle under 
the pine trees (all being much older than GGS 
and some with desert sand in their ears) to 
whom he opened, "Gentlemen we will do this 
a t tack at night with armour." Their j aws 
dropped noticeably.12 
Its sheer scope was so much larger than life 
that it ensured every participant was a share 
holder in its s u c c e s s . I t was S imonds ' 
masterpiece and it had everything, from flame-
breathing Crocodiles to electronic warfare. It 
was clearly bound to fail. 
There were no doctrinal precedents, unless 
one decided that the classic was El Alamein, 
and the best way to win in Normandy was to 
launch a Montgomery-style desert attack.13 It 
was "Bluecoat's" terrible experience with mines 
that appears to have inspired Simonds to plan 
"Totalize's" armoured crawl. It is not recorded 
if any II Corps staff officer suggested to Simonds 
that mines readily sown by German infantry, 
such as in the closed country south of Villers-
Bocage,14 was a near impossible task in the open 
country south of Caen. "Totalize" was too 
complex, and like "Spring" before it, based on 
untrained, unrehearsed troops. No one dared 
tell the emperor about his clothes. It is perhaps 
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objective, consolidate it during darkness and 
wait for pick up in the morning.16 
The solution to his problem was found on 
the Russian front which used overwhelming 
artillery on a front wide enough to tear holes 
that could not be plugged or covered by fire. 
The Russian offensive tore out divisional-sized 
sec t ions of front, pou red in a r m o u r e d 
battlegroups and immediately did battle with 
panzer reserves which they overwhelmed. 
Simonds did not learn from the Russians, 
although ironically, a delegation from Stalin 
visited him on 27-29 July,17 just as "Totalize" 
was ordered. 
.. .asking what the enemy strength opposite us 
was compared to our own. When we told them 
and that we were going to attack they were 
greatly surprised. They stated that they would 
not attack unless they outnumbered the enemy 
by at least 5 or 6 to l.18 
Simonds and his staff smiled politely and 
ignored the Russians; they lacked style and it 
was quickly assumed they lacked credibility. In 
fact, the Soviets were "echelons above"19 the 
Western Allies and Soviet strategic offensives 
were launched on a level of sophistication 
unknown to 21 Army Group.20 Yet, if one 
compared actual infantry strengths and tank-
artillery superiority, Simonds was very close to 
21 
unfair to criticize Simonds. At least he tried. 
At least he attempted innovation. But the 
simple truth was that he was out of doctrinal 
ideas. He really did not know what to do with 
his infantry or armour. He was trying new 
combinations, gambling with lives to save lives. 
Whereas tanks were used in small-sized 
portions during "Spring" and "Atlantic," this time 
there would be a surfeit of armour - two tank 
brigades in Phase 1 and two entire armoured 
divisions in Phase 2. The forthcoming traffic jam 
should have been predicted by the movement 
planning officers. It probably was. The road 
march to the form-up place for Phase 1 was "a 
dusty hell-you couldn't see much."15 Simonds 
planned to use the cab rank in the air for support 
during the advance; he also created an armoured 
cab rank at the "Totalize" startline. Attack along 
narrow fronts seems to have been the only option 
he could think of: 
Put down a fog upon it and it is helpless. 
Introduce into that fog, not a long straggling 
line of tanks, striving to see each other and 
painfully keeping direction, bu t a mass , a 
"phalanx," of tanks on a narrow front. What 
hope have the defenders got? Those in the path 
of the charge are overwhelmed from right, centre 
and left. Those on the flanks hear the noise, 
but cannot see to interfere. The tanks, followed 
by (or carrying) their infantry, go through to their 
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the ideal Russian attack ratio of 10:1. Here was 
a golden opportunity for victory. "Totalize" 
required a classic artillery offensive. Instead, 
Simonds invented a monster mine field and 
then applied the principles that won El Alamein 
for Montgomery and cost him "Spring." 
All Revved Up and No Place To Go 
Totalize" has been misrepresented as a 
masterpiece of planning. The battle is 
seen for the tinsel not the tree. The simple fact 
remains that "Totalize" was essentially a slower 
and more tightly controlled version of "Spring." 
While the latter gave the brigades and divisions 
little room for creative maneuver, "Totalize" 
ensured there was none. Bombers were new, 
night was not. Simonds's mine phobia was new, 
although not a single "Spring" attack faltered 
because of mines, and the Germans paraded 
no less that eight panzer battlegroups across 
the open area behind Verrières throughout 21-
26 July. Tanks leading was new. Tanks leading 
at night was most certainly unusual. Simonds 
hoped to succeed on the narrow corridor he 
predicted was the key to success in his 
February Operational Guide, except that this 
time there were four columns, and each was 
exactly four tanks wide. 
It must be remembered that there was no 
place to go. Once a breakthrough had occurred, 
the entire offensive would stop and wait for a 
daylight attack by American B-17s to blast 
more Norman villages out of the ground. This 
imposed the initial delay on success. The 
attackers would then loiter at the startline until 
two armoured divisions completed a forward 
passage of lines and settled into the Phase 2 
line of departure. Only then could the armour 
break out. The criticisms are obvious and have 
already been made elsewhere.21 
A passage of lines exercise is always difficult, 
but was bound to be chaotic with two untried 
armoured divisions. To make it even tougher, 
Simonds had decided to attack two up; he 
squeezed 1st Polish Armoured Division (1st 
PAD) beside 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
(4th CAD) and gave each a frontage of one 
thousand yards. The Poles' startline "was 
complicated by the fact that they had heavily 
wooded areas on their front."22 The armoured 
22 
commanders did not like it. "Both General 
Maczek, who commanded the Poles, and I 
asked General Simonds to extend our frontage 
to give us room for maneuver, but he would 
not agree as it would mean changing the 
objectives of one of the assaulting divisions."23 
Simonds was gambling. He "wanted to shoot 
the works" on the second phase of "Totalize," 
"That is why he used two divisions, he thought 
that at least one would get through."24 It seemed 
like a calculated risk, but armoured divisions do 
not function like Army Groups Royal Artillery 
(AGRAs). Squeezing more into less space does 
not result in overwhelming fire superiority, but 
instead, confusion and inviting targets for 88s. 
"Totalize": 7 / 8 August -
The First Night Attack 
There were other difficulties.24 Second Canadian Armoured Brigade (2nd CAB) and 
33rd British Armoured Brigade (33rd BAB) were 
required, as the force in place, to assist 4th CAD 
and 1st PAD in their movement forward, secure 
the startline and allow them to launch into Phase 
2 in an orderly fashion. But the lead tank 
brigades had their own problems. "Soon 
visibility literally nil.. .hampered by large bomb 
craters...tanks fell in...recovery impossible."25 
Navigation tanks soon became ditched and 
communication problems mounted. The leading 
elements became "hopelessly intermingled and 
confusion was made worse by the flails who had 
not been present at the rehearsal and who lost 
station very early in the proceedings."26 Entire 
troops were lost, some for over 24 hours . 
Regiments lost direction and became involved in 
friendly firefights. Several squadrons actually 
steered a 180 degree course change in the dust, 
darkness and excitement of combat. 
Morning found them anything but a force-
in-place; rather, scat tered combat teams 
holding an area that ended at the bomb line 
for Phase 2. No mines had been encountered. 
German defensive fire was scat tered, 
panicky, and mostly ineffective. The dust and 
confusion hindered progress. Tilly did not fall 
until 0800 hours and Rocquancourt was not 
fully secured until after midday. The Canadian 
armour arrived steadily on the battlefield until 
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A Sherman Flail tank, crucial in Simonds' mind, to deal with the 
"monster minefield" which lay in the path of the Canadian advance. 
both divisions had the bulk of their tank 
brigades formed up north of the start line, about 
0830 hours on the morning of the 8th. Before 
them lay open country. Simonds had broken 
through. 
The morgenmeldung sent a chill through 
von Kluge: "We have to risk everything. A 
breakthrough has occurred near Caen the like 
of which we have never seen."27 While all the 
criticism of "Totalize" may be valid - it was 
unnecessarily complex, confused and much too 
slow-nevertheless, 2nd Corps had muddled 
through. Despite himself, Simonds had broken 
past all three lines of the German defence-in-
depth. Nothing lay between him and Falaise 
except scattered Kampjgruppen of 12th SS 
Hitlerjugend Division which were slowly moving 
n o r t h w a r d s p receded by thei r worried 
commander. 
Would Simonds boldly drive to Falaise? No. 
He called for a halt to allow the artillery to catch 
up and the heavy bombers to pulverize his 
imagined secondary defence zone. Simonds's 
conviction tha t von Kluge had created a 
Grosskampf HKL behind his HKL on Verrières 
is unfortunate, for there was no secondary area 
of defence. Every passing minute allowed Meyer 
and Dietrich to bring in more reserves into 
blocking positions to seal the break. It has been 
suggested that it was too late to call off the 
bombers. Crerar would probably have been 
reluctant to tell Harris "no thanks after all" 
following the difficult staff work and 
coordination required to switch them on in the 
first place. At first light all forward advance 
stopped as II Canadian Corps waited on their 
startlines for the B-17s to arrive, something 
which would not happen for another six hours.28 
The Green Fields Beyond 
Kitching must have realized he had finally taken his division into the "green fields 
beyond." Ahead of him lay golden wheat fields 
that stretched all the way to Patton and Paris. 
His opposite number , "Schnellemeyer"2 9 
responded in his traditionally aggressive style 
although he was momentarily shaken by the 
sight of the retreating 89th Infantry Division.30 
He got out of his kubelwagen and rallied the 
broken infantry.31 Meyer quickly organized a 
blocking position around Cintheaux then drove 
north to see for himself. Auftragstaktik, the 
doctrine of ad hoc command, again saved the 
German army. Although this scene could have 
happened in the Canadian, British or American 
armies, it was more normal in the German. The 
British/Canadian Regimental system, tribal 
identity, "our officers" - "their officers," the "look-
23 
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Panzer Gegenangriff 
When Meyer arrived at the Canadian front line he was astounded: "Seeing these 
concentrations of tanks almost took our breath 
away."33 There before him lay S imonds ' 
armoured might. The strange thing was that 
no one moved. The blitz that should have swept 
forward and carried away the 89th stragglers, 
his own Kampfgruppes and indeed, Meyer 
himself, sat fixed. "We could not comprehend 
the behaviour of the Canadians. Why did these 
overwhelming tank forces not push on their 
attack?"34 As Meyer surveyed the Canadian 
armour, he noticed the single B-17 overhead. 
"It flew across the terrain several times and 
then set a visual marker."35 It was a Pathfinder, 
the "FOO" of the heavy bombers; an airborne 
forward air controller, leading the heavy 
bomber stream and marking the target. Meyer 
had seen it before the bombing of Caen and 
"Goodwood." The puzzle of Simonds's inactivity 
was solved. He raced to his radio: "Get Closer! 
Get Closer!"36 If his panzers remained on high 
ground, they would be destroyed. Safety lay 
near the Canadian startline. He directed his 
Kampfgruppes to attack immediately.37 
The counterattacks ordered by Meyer were 
ano ther "who's-who" of t ank warfare in 
Normandy. The Hitlerjugend brought up the 
great warriors of the SS: Krause, Waldmuller, 
Wunsche and, the "Black Knight" himself, 
Michael Wit tman. The highly decora ted 
Wittman was already a legend on both German 
fronts and his most recent coup was the almost 
single-handed thwarting of Operation "Perch" 
by counterattacking 7th Armoured Division on 
12 June and forcing XXX British Corps back 
to its startline.38 
Waldmuller and Wittman arrived first and 
smartly went into the counterattack. As they 
shook-out in the open fields leading to Point 122, 
the center of the Canadian startline, Waldmuller 
left his panzergrenadiers and Jagdpanzer IVs 
from JPzAbt 12 at Cintheaux, creating a block 
on the main road. His Panzer Mk.IVs 
maneuvered northeast while Wittman's Tigers 
rumbled due north beside Route 158. Tigers 
always attacked if the opportunity presented 
itself. The benefit of creating elite schwerpanzer 
battalions was that they were well-trained, highly 
motivated and exhibited a faith in the superiority 
"Totalize" - Attack Formation 
Lead Regimental Battlegroup 
All troops in "line ahead" 
the-other-regiment-broke" mentality generally 
made ad lib regrouping difficult. Canadians and 
British lived in their solitudes. Regiments 
watched other regiments being shattered while 
waiting for orders . Brigade commanders 
watched brigades being decimated and waited 
for orders. Auftragstaktik doctrine allowed for 
tactical initiative; German discipline ensured 
tha t leaders of impromptu ba t t legroups 
followed orders without question. German 
senior headquarters reacted immediately to 
"Totalize." Sepp Dietrich, Commander I SS 
Panzer Korps ordered 12th SS to stop the 
enemy breakthrough with a counterattack. At 
the same time General Eberbach, the supreme 
commander of 5 Panzerarmee drove up to meet 
Meyer in Urville and "agreed with 
PanzerMeyer's assessment of the situation and 
supported his decisions for a counter-attack."32 
Meyer decided to strike with two battlegroups: 
Kampfgruppe Waldmuller and Kampfgruppe 
Krause. He then deployed the remainder of his 
division. 
24 
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lifted into the air and slammed into the ground 
behind Pzkw No. 007. The ace of aces was dead. 
The deba te over who scored th i s most 
spectacular of tank kills still continues.41 
The a t t ack by Wit tman 's Tigers and 
Waldmule r ' s t anks d is rupted the entire 
Canadian front. Although the 12th SS attack 
was a mixed bag of Mark IVs and JagdPanzer 
IVs, the ferocity and aggressiveness of their 
thrust set 4th Armoured and 1st Polish back 
on their heels. Directly above the German attack 
flew the 492 Fortresses from US 8th Air Force.42 
A couple of lead bombers dropped short. The 
airborne OP desperately flew into the bomber 
stream wiggling his wings to signal the error, but 
the following squadrons followed suit and 
released their bombs. The 1st Polish Armoured 
was badly hit as were elements of 3rd Canadian 
Division, the main headquarters of 2nd CAB, 2nd 
Cdn AGRA and 9 AGRA. Shock and confusion 
followed. At 1330 hours Simonds's Headquarters 
demanded Crerar "Stop all bombing."43 Simonds 
had considered calling off the bombers earlier, 
but it was too late. The 8th AF was already 
airborne and his communication chain was too 
cumbersome to allow quick action.44 The 
bombing went in and it was a debacle. In typical 
style, Simonds pronounced: "From now on it will 
be the RAF."45 The B-17s flattened the target 
villages but they disrupted more Canadian 
formations than German.46 One Canadian 
casualty was General Rod Keller, last seen being 
carried into an ambulance shouting to his 
batman: "Roberts, bring me my pistol! I'm going 
to shoot the first American I see!"47 
of their machines that often ignored tactical 
reality. This time there was little choice. 
Wittman adjusted his throat mike and ordered 
"Panzer Marsch!" 
Second CAB and 4nd CAB were assaulted 
by Waldmûller's Kampjgruppe (39 Mk.IVs and 
four Tigers) as they jockeyed for fire positions 
north of Gaumesnil. The odds, 43 tanks against 
600, were ridiculous. However, because of the 
narrow frontage, the best Simonds's brigades 
could do was to each deploy two squadrons 
forward. That reduced the combat ratio to 1:2. 
With the advantage of high morale and 
unorthodox tactics, Waldmûller's Kampjgruppe 
used the scattered farmhouses for cover and 
closed the distance, firing as it moved from 
bound to bound. 
Wittman, alone with a handful of Tigers, 
simply charged up the center: "raced right into 
enemy fire...his tactic during such situations: 
Get through! Don't stop! Into the dirt and reach 
a free field of fire."39 His Tigers advanced in "V" 
formation, stopping briefly near the hedgerow 
at Gaumesnil, then rolled across the open 
fields, pausing now and then to fire and knock 
out a Sherman at long range. As the distance 
closed, 17-pounders from 2nd CAB replied. 
"The attention of the attacking Tigers was 
concentrated on the Canadian tanks of the 2nd 
Canad ian Armoured Brigade which was 
advanc ing on bo th s ides of the Route 
Nationale." 4 0 Sudden ly Wit tman 's Tiger 
exploded. The flash, then fireball, temporarily 
blinded the Allied tank gunners. The turret was 
A column of "unfrocked 
Priests"-M7 SPs con-
verted to armoured 
personnel carriers -
with troops from the 
51st Highland Division, 
7 August 1944 
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Command and Control: 
Kitching's Kampfgruppen 
T he bombers cost Simonds time. As the 1st PAD and 4th CAD were trying to sort 
themse lves out , they were a t t acked by 
Kampfgruppe Waldmuller: "It immediately 
engaged Polish infantry. The grim duels of 
panzers against tanks were fought by the fighting 
vehicles of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
and Michael Wittman's Tigers."48 The attack 
disrupted H-Hour. "Totalize's" second phase did 
not get going until 1530 hours, two hours late. 
At the time, my division was accused of being 
slow in getting to our start line...because of 
our very restricted frontage, had only about 
five hundred yards in which to maneuver. This 
was the normal frontage for a squadron to 
operate in....49 
Kitching's grouping cannot be faulted. His 
vanguard was an armour/infantry battlegroup 
named, in German style, after their commander. 
By 1800 hours, the lead attack by Halpenny 
Force (The Canadian Grenadier Guards and The 
Lake Superior Regiment) had bogged down a 
kilometre south of Cintheaux, still held by the 
ad hoc rear guard thrown together by Meyer. 
Maczek's lead brigade, attacking two regiments 
up with 2nd Pulk Pancerna and 24th Lancers, 
had forced Waldmuller's Mk.IVs back but now 
ran into another counterattack from the east by 
the Divisionbegleitkompanie (Divisional Escort 
Company) which had Jagdpanzer IVs under 
command. The well-armoured, low-silhouetted 
tank destroyers brewed up 26 Shermans. "The 
Poles no longer dared to leave Cramesnil 
forest."50 Simonds, trying to control the battle 
by radio was not pleased: "Why don't the Poles 
get on?"51 Maczek tried to explain but it fell on 
deaf ears. 
Les Allemandes avaient caché des cannons 
an t i - tank et quelques "Tigres" dans deux 
bosquets, séparés par une petite plaine. Le 2e 
Regt tomba dans un guet-apens quand il arriva 
entre ces taillis. Sa surpris fut totale. Mais on 
effectua aussitôt un regroupement de blindés 
et dans un bruit infernal l'avance continua 
lente et inexorable.52 
Although they faced mostly Mark IVs, the 1st 
PAD attack against Meyer's elastic defence could 
not make progress on the narrow front. Worse, 
"Totalize's" pause gave Lieutenant-General 
Wolfgang Pickert, commander 3rd Flak Corps, 
time to deploy his 88s to complement the anti-
tank pak front 12th SS had formed with their 
own divisional flak in the Quesnay Wood area. 
The Canadian attacks went in unsupported 
and piecemeal. As Meyer noted: "We were 
unbelievably lucky - the opposite side did not 
carry out one single concentrated attack."33 By 
1510 hours the Poles reported they were 
regrouping. The Canadian Grenadier Guards 
conducted a series of squadron-level attacks, 
trying to shoot infantry ba t t a l ions into 
Cintheaux or attempting to maneuver past 
individual strong points. By last light, the 
regiment had lost 17 tanks. 4th CAB had fought 
40 tanks south to Langannerie, east of Route 
158. There they were finally stopped by 88 fire 
from Pickert's guns and Flakabt 12 in Quesnay 
Wood. "In less than forty-eight hours the hulks 
of over 150 Sherman tanks dotted the rolling 
wheatfields north of the Laison River."54 
Despite exhortations throughout the day by 
Kitching, who was in turn being hounded by 
Simonds, the armoured regiments could not get 
going. Inexperienced, rattled by Waldmuller's 
counter-attack, and shaken by the friendly 
bombing, 4 CAB moved gingerly past the craters 
and reacted with undue tactical intent to any 
enemy salvo. This was their baptism of fire. The 
Commander of 4th Armoured Brigade, Brigadier 
R.A. Booth, proved a disappointment in that he 
behaved in the same indecisive manner as 
Wyman. He had been promoted from lieutenant-
colonel directly to Brigadier and was given 4 
CAB because of his alleged battle experience and 
tactical competence. He was a firm believer in 
the battlegroup and was convinced that the 
Fuller system (massed tanks alone had little 
chance of success) was wrong. Actually, "tanks 
alone," more correctly, a tank-heavy battle 
group with little or no infantry but accompanied 
by FOOs, FACs and engineers, could do 
wondrous things against an armoured counter-
attack force. Dynamic leadership was essential, 
but Booth had as little success with his 
regiments as Wyman.55 
When Halpenny Force a p p r o a c h e d 
Bretteville-le-Rabet, they were engaged by fire 
from Meyer's anti-tank battalion and 88s from 
Pickert's pak front. The tactical answer was 
maneuver by battlegroup, not tactics at the 
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squadron level. Maneuver required a brigadier 
or GSO to point regiments in the right direction. 
The battlegroups were overwhelmed by their 
first action. They either forgot about the 
supporting arms or were "not wholly aware of 
the capabilities of the gunners; we were never 
asked for smoke."56 Instead of using the team 
work to take out rear-guard positions, the 
squadrons tried to do it themselves and failed: 
"...during these actions we never received one 
request for fire support and we began to think 
we were just along for the ride."57 In its first 
battle, 4th Armoured tried to feel its way 
around the blocking force, looking for a hole. 
When it found an enemy strongpoint, its 
regiments attacked it. It has been suggested 
that the inexperience of 4th CAD and 1st PAD 
resulted in the error of "pausing to deal with 
strongpoints rather than bypassing them."58 In 
fact, there was no room to do this as long as 
Corps held them to their boundaries. There 
were no open flanks in the narrow frontage 
Simonds gave to Kitching and Maczek. An 
a r m o u r e d regiment bypasses an enemy 
strongpoint by saturating it with direct and 
indirect fire, then maneuvering around the 
open flank using its own smoke as protection. 
Any attempt to seek out un trou Normande 
would meet with the long reach of an 88 or 
super 75.59 Eventually it was too late; the 
squadrons required fuel, ammunition, rest, and 
mostly a conference to sort everyone out. 
Kitching, pushed by Simonds, quite rightly 
wanted the breakout to keep going. Every hour 
lost meant more Tigers, more Panthers and 
more panzergrenadiers on the battlefield. 
The Corps commander had ordered them 
to press on through the night. But they were 
not going to heed his requests. It was not in 
the i r doc t r ine . To S imonds ' s rage, the 
a rmoured regiments did exactly what all 
armoured regiments had been doing since 
1939. To Simonds ' s fury and Kitching's 
exasperation60 the regimental COs fell back on 
their Dorset training61 and went back to a "rear 
rally" and laagered.62 "[A] momentous decision -
which granted Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer a 
respite of seven hours to rally the 89th Division 
and deploy his 12th SS Panzer Division -
vitiated Simonds's intention 'to press straight 
on steadily regardless.'"63 This was combat 
refusal with dire future consequences both on 
the men of 4th CAB and their commander. 
28 
Nothing Booth could do would change 
things; indeed, he does not seem to have tried. 
He disappeared from the battlefield and had to 
be personally ferreted out by Kitching, who was 
so exasperated that he went forward to sort 
out Booth personally. He found him asleep in 
his tank: 
I had the greatest difficulty in locating him and 
he would not answer calls on the radio. When 
I finally found him he was nearly two miles 
away from the battle and fast asleep in his tank. 
I personally had to climb up on the tank to 
wake him and tell him to go and see what was 
happening. I was so angry that I ordered him 
out of the tank and gave him a tongue-lashing 
for five minutes. He was almost in tears when 
he went forward.64 
By then it was too late for everyone. 4th CAB 
did not get going again until the next day and 
"Totalize" lost another eight hours. 
Kitching or Maczek waited too long to sort 
things out when their brigade commanders 
began to lose their grip. Simonds tried to light 
a fire under his corps but was not sure which 
division needed his at tention most. First 
Canadian Army HQ watched patiently, hoping 
Simonds would find a solution. While Crerar 
stayed in his Headquarters,65 his opposite 
number, SS General Eberbach, his face badly 
scarred from battle burns, a Ritterkreuz at his 
throat, drove forward to see "Totalize" and then 
went to von Kluge to discuss their dilemma: 
the "personlichen Befehl des Fuhrers" ordering 
continued efforts toward Avranches versus the 
very real threat of at least two Canadian 
armoured divisions about to breakthrough to 
Falaise. His sombre evaluation convinced the 
Fieldmarshal to release the Panther Abteilung 
of 9th Panzer Division and 102nd SS sPzAbt 
(Tigers) as reinforcements for Meyer: "I have 
no other forces left. If this keeps going the same 
way tomorrow, we shall be unable to stop it."66 
Simonds was still determined to make 
something of "Totalize"; he would again attack 
at night and would use searchlights to create 
"movement light."67 Both battlegroups were 
given objectives astride Highway 158, the road 
to Falaise. The Grenadier Guards were told to 
clear Bretteville-le-Rabet. Aggressive leadership 
could push them past Quesnay woods. A brisk 
flanking maneuver would easily bring them to 
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Point 140, highest of the bluffs overlooking the 
Laison River, and a springboard for Falaise. The 
BCRs were ordered to take Point 195, a knoll 
with the same character is t ics as Hill 67 in tha t 
i t resembled an open plain unt i l the crest then 
fell away sou th overlooking the approaches to 
the Laison, the Laize and finally, Falaise. Point 
195 was west of Highway 158. The arrival of 
two a r m o u r e d b a t t l e g r o u p s on the Laison 
would break down the door leading to Falaise, 
Chambo i s , a n d Argen tan . The Hitlerjugend 
would not be able to cover a b reak th rough six 
miles wide. 
"Totalize" deserves some study. It was the 
first Canad ian a t tack by a complete a rmoured 
corps. I t was the first occasion since early J u n e 
t ha t ba lanced bat t legroups were used in the 
a t tack and was also the first time tha t proper 
armoured battlegroups were created. Le Mesnil-
Patry saw Wyman order the Queen's Own Rifles 
to ride on tanks which entered the battlefield a 
s q u a d r o n at a t ime. Wyman never u sed his 
brigade as a complete weapon, although it was 
available. Kitching gave Booth the reins. 
The c o m b a t r a t io finally f avoured t h e 
attacking Canadians; Booth alone had 240 tanks 
against abou t 100 t anks available to Meyer. 
Further, Meyer, whose panzers were still arriving 
in the area, had to cover the entire front and 
main ta in a reserve. The only reinforcements 
expected were the Pan the r bat ta l ion from 9 
Panzer, seconded to Meyer on von Kluge's order 
and the grenadiers of the 85th Infantry Division, 
arriving on bicycles via Vimoutiers and Trun. 
At tack ing with two a r m o u r e d divis ions 
forward m e a n t Meyer would be forced to divide 
his resources . At best, 50 German t anks would 
b e c a p a b l e o f i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h B o o t h ' s 
concentra t ion of over 200 S h e r m a n s . As well, 
Simonds had immediate access to Wyman's 2nd 
CAB, which had already enjoyed a punch up w i t h 
Waldmuller and Wittman. This allowed an attack 
ratio of roughly 425 Shermans and another 240 
Polish tanks against Meyer's scattered zugs. The 
prospect of tactical victory was within realistic 
reach. In terms of Fireflies alone, the Canadian 
attackers held a decisive numerical advantage. 
In the early hours of 9 August 4th CAD finally 
got its regiments going. Kitching had a rough 
idea of how to go about this armoured business. 
This was another opportunity to b reak out and 
achieve opera t ional maneuver . All the bold 
things tha t were going on in "Cobra," t ha t h a d 
occurred in Barbarossa and France 1940, were 
there for the taking. 
F o u r t h CAB deployed t w o - t h i r d s of i ts 
a rmoured brigade as ba lanced Kampfgruppen: 
"Halpenny Force," a n d "Worthington Force" 
which was a second armoured battlegroup based 
on the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (the 
British Columbia Regiment) grouped with three 
companies of the Algonquin Regiment mounted 
in White half-track armoured personnel carriers. 
However, as one military historian pu t it "the 
subsequent performance of this force in contrast 
with that of Halpenny's illustrated the depth of 
the tact ical sch izophren ia t h a t gr ipped the 
armoured corps of the British and Canadian 
armies."68 
Armoured Breakthrough: The Death 
of Worthington Force - 9 August 
Li eu tenan t -Colone l Don Wor th ing ton (no relation to General F.F. Worthington), started 
out in darkness . The plan was simple: south 
beside Route 158, then cross the highway and 
head west to the highest piece of ground. It 
should have worked. However, a night approach 
t h r o u g h w h a t h a d now become a G e r m a n 
defensive zone instead of a rear area, was a risky 
challenge for a regiment in its first battle. The 
atmosphere, already electric with the excitement 
of first enemy contact, was heightened by the 
confused pace of the advance. 
It was so dark I could only see the red back 
lights of the tank In front. Sometimes we crawled 
along. Finally we just stopped and waited for 
first light. There were break downs. My troop 
pulled out around a broken down Sherman and 
promptly got lost-there were too many tank 
tracks. The Regiment was being led by Lt "Wing 
Ding" Wilson - he made a right turn but 
everyone else turned left - didn't believe "Wing 
Ding" could navigate.. .that's how we got lost."69 
The main body of Worthington Force turned east. 
They may have been confused by the h a r d 
surface road that ran east from Bretteville-le-
Rabet and mistaken it for Highway 158. Then, 
"high ground was sighted and we headed for it."70 
They arrived in the area of Point 140, bluffs 
overlooking the Laison River, a n d s topped . 
"Without knowing it Worthington h a d captured 
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Canadian armour awaits the order to advance. 
inability to close the distance to Worthington's 
battlegroup as it was being steadily decimated 
on Hill 140. A determined drive would have not 
only rescued the BCRs but probably crossed the 
Laison and completely turned Meyer's flank. 
Maczek's leading squadrons could not have 
helped but notice the plight of the BCRs and 
Algonquins . Several t imes the i r t a n k s 
attempted to give suppor t -10 th Chasseurs 
advanced to St. Sylvain but were forced back 
by a handful of Panthers. A second regiment, 
1st Fulk Pancerna, commanded by Major 
Stefanowicz, attacked from the northeast and 
claimed to have reached the Laison River near 
Rouvres where they shot up a bicycle company 
from 85th German Infantry. They were 
immediately engaged by Wunsche. Stefanowicz, 
without infantry or FOOs, decided to retreat.72 
Meanwhile, around Point 140, 12th SS 
Panzer Regiment counterattacked by fire from 
long range. The remainder of SS schPzAbt 101's 
Tigers (reinforced with a zug from 102) 
approached from the southwest , crossed 
Highway 158, and took out 28 CAR's Shermans 
from an area south of Quesnay and the high 
ground across the Laison. Concurrently, 
Wunsche's Panthers drove northeast then circled 
to complete the envelopment. The Polish 
armoured regiments were taken on at long range 
one of the Polish a r m o u r e d division 's 
objectives."71 Tragically, they were on the wrong 
hill. 
Worthington's force set off a real panic in 
12th SS. The front had been penetrated. The 
only thing that stood between the BCRs and 
Falaise was Meyer's own HQ, about three 
kilometres away. He ordered Kampjgruppe 
Wunsche to counterattack immediately. Using 
a Panther company from 1 Abt, 12th SS Panzer 
Regiment and a handful of recently arrived 
Tigers from the 102 SS sPzAbt, Wunsche 
ordered a double envelopment to hit the BCRs 
from n o r t h and s o u t h . This was more 
practicality than clever tactics. Each element 
served a double purpose. The southern hook of 
Tigers would engage Worthington's Shermans at 
long range while covering against an approach 
along Route 158. The northern hook blocked an 
advance by 1st PAD Armoured whose regiments 
were right behind Worthington. 
The Poles' performance was not discernibly 
better on the 9th. Although they were operating 
on the eastern flank of Simonds's morning 
attack and thus faced considerably fewer anti-
tank positions, their advance was quickly halted 
as was the Grenadier Guards' advance on 
Quesnay Wood. The real tragedy was their 
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by these Panthers supported by a few Mk.IVs 
and JPz.IVs left over from Waldmuller's 8 
August attack. Again these were mistakenly 
reported as Tigers and the over cautious 
leading Pulks stopped short and withdrew from 
the disadvantage of a long-range gun duel. 
Although 12th SS Krieggesichte credi ts 
Maczek's attack with destroying two German 
combat teams,73 Simonds was exasperated with 
both Kitching and Maczek and the "complete 
lack of communication."74 His anger finally 
forced him forward, where he chewed out the 
first regimental commander he saw.75 The Poles 
vexed Simonds and drew scorn from Kitching: 
I don't know what went wrong with the Poles 
on those two days, 8 and 9 August, but they 
certainly were no help to us.. . . I formed a poor 
opinion of the Poles in that battle. If they had 
been as aggressive as Worthington had been 
they would have been there to relieve him of 
some of the fierce pressure....76 
In Maczek's defence, the inexperience and real 
fear of his men cannot be discounted. On their 
move to the "Totalize" form-up point both the 
4th CAD and 1st PAD drove through part of 
the "Goodwood" battlefield. Tank crews gaped 
at the sight of the 60 odd burned out hulks 
that still littered the area. If that did not shake 
them up, it certainly created an attitude of 
serious caution. Aggressive leaders quickly 
overcame this as with the example of Canadian 
Grenadier Gua rds t roop commande r 
Lieutenant LP. Phelan who knocked out 11 
anti-tank guns "in as many minutes"77 during 
"Totalize." But the Poles, despite seeing the 
BCR's predicament decided not to rush the 
Panthers engaging Worthington. Whenever a 
Pulk advanced, it was savagely engaged by 
Wunsche. Maczek reported: 
right flank held up by enemy anti-tank guns 
at 110485...can you do anything about it?...3 
PW taken 1700 hrs. . .ident 25 Gr Regt. 25 PzGr 
divided into 3 groups. First Waldmiiller. Second 
Krause.. .other battle group on their right flank. 
They have tanks Mk IV and VI estimate 10-20 
strong. Enemy inf defending St. Sylvain. En 
making good use of mortars.78 
German aggressiveness, and the ever 
present fear of Tiger by inexperienced crews, 
saved Meyer but killed Worthington: "les 
Allemandes lancèrent de fortes contre-attaques 
appuyées par des Tigres. Elles furent toutes 
brisées et nous infligeâmes des pertes très 
lourdes à l'ennemi...les Allemandes contre-
attaquerent farouchement."79 Despite strikes 
from RAF Typhoons and the presence of the 
Polish vangua rd only two miles away, 
Worthington Force was left unsuppor ted 
throughout the entire day as Wunsche's tanks 
picked them off one by one. 
Canadian infantry moves up to attack. 
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whether Canadian, British or Polish, the BCR 
breakthrough would have been the tale of 
Rommel's 7th Panzer on the Sedan. One 
difficulty was that Worthington did not know 
where he was, but conversely neither did Kitching 
or Simonds. To paraphrase Wilde, losing one's 
armoured regiment in the dark is unfortunate, 
but for a division to lose an entire battlegroup in 
clear daylight is sheer carelessness.84 
There were attempts made to find them. 
The 4th Division Commander, Royal Artillery, 
Brigadier J.N. "Herm" Lane, frustrated at his 
guns' seeming inability to support the BCRs, 
flew his Moth spotter aircraft south along Route 
158 searching for Worthington Force. His eyes 
fixed onto Hill 195; he reported no contact as 
he determinedly flew past that feature until he 
could actually see Falaise. Had he glanced left85 
he would have quickly spotted a regiment of 
Sherman tanks on high ground, mixed with 
half-tracks and infantry, with scores of vehicles 
burning black smoke. That he failed to see them 
is a mystery. The simplest explanation is he 
did look and because they were not supposed 
to be there, he did not see them. What he did 
see, he decided, were the Shermans of Maczek's 
Polish Division. 
Liaison be tween II Corps and the 
suppor t ing RAF headqua r t e r s was poor. 
Typhoons had been supporting the BCRs for 
hours. The information was not relayed to 
Kitching or Simonds. Finally, an armoured 
officer might ask the obvious question: where 
was the recce? With five reconnaissance 
regiments at their disposal, two of them 
armoured,86 Kitching and Simonds had the 
resources to find Worthington. Again the 
By evening the entire Regiment's tanks, the 
half tracks of the Algonquin Regiment, and 
most of the men had been killed or wounded.80 
Hill 140 was an armoured graveyard abandoned 
to the Germans. Among the dead was the gallant 
Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington.81 Kitching's 
armoured assault was over, and for all intents 
and purposes, so was "Totalize." Kurt Meyer's 
analysis bears repeating: 
Every opening phase of a Canadian Operation 
was a complete success and the staff work a 
mathematical masterpiece...every Canadian 
Operation bore the mark of intensive planning 
and was built on sound principles. Canadians 
never followed up their opening success to 
reach a complete victory. Every one of the 
C a n a d i a n a t t a c k s los t i ts p u s h a n d 
determination after a few miles. Armoured 
warfare is a matter of using opportunities on 
the bat t lef ie ld, therefore the Divisional 
Commander belongs with the leading combat 
group.82 
Much has been made about the BCR's arrival 
on the wrong objective: "This episode, with its 
tragic mixture of gallantry and ineptitude...."83 
The BCRs may have been lost but II Canadian 
Corps had also lost the BCRs. Worthington's 
attack has been seen as the glass half empty; 
the fact remains that a battlegroup had broken 
through and penetrated into Meyer's rear area. 
Nothing lay between Worthington and Falaise. 
What the BCRs (indeed, Kitching) desperately 
needed was to have success reinforced. In the 
full scope of an armoured breakthrough, 
particularly at the corps level, a matter of four 
miles is mere bagatelle. Maneuver warfare rapidly 
encompasses enemy positions. Had Worthington 
been followed immediately by a second regiment 
and then by a second armoured brigade, 
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answer may lie in doctrinal evolution. By the 
summer of 1944 wise heads in the Armoured 
Corps decided that a better way to use the 
divisional recce regiment would be to ignore 
doctrine and use its tanks as another armoured 
uni t , e i ther as reserve or a suppor t ing 
battlegroup.87 
Simonds sent the Canadian Grenadier 
Guards south to look at 195. They were quickly 
turned back by Pickert's 88s.88 The rest of the 
day was spent in frustrating radio calls. Simonds 
was alarmed at the lack of information as to 
the whereabouts of some 4th Division units. He 
visited 4th Division Headquarters twice on the 
9th hoping to find things straightened out. I knew 
he was disappointed but trying not to show it.89 
II Canadian Corps (13 armoured regiments) 
simply stopped and waited for the BCRs to find 
themselves. Neither the Poles nor 4th CAB 
seemed to be capable of maneuvering past the 
handful of tanks Wunsche had holding the 
flanks. The determination of Maczek's division 
is in question. They were well past the shock 
of being bombed and now faced an open front 
where they could maneuver. The presence of a 
Canadian regiment on their objective seems to 
have made little impression: 
There certainly was a tremendous difference 
between the aggressiveness of the leading 
a rmoured regiments - more par t icular the 
Canadian than the Polish....Some seemed to 
t u rn away in face of comparatively minor 
opposition.90 
The real mystery is Army communications. 
The Germans benefited from Canadian lapses 
in wireless and general security.91 If Maczek's 
rear link reported the action and contact with 
Canadian Shermans to II Canadian Corps 
Headquarters, it does not appear to have 
reached S imonds . 9 2 The s t a t u s of 
communications is one of the more serious 
difficulties that Simonds experienced both at 
"Totalize" and "Tractable." Eventually this lack 
of control was to cost Kitching his job. It should 
be pointed out that neither Kitching nor 
Simonds had exercised their commands in 
England before Normandy.93 Fourth CAD and 
1st PAD arrived in Normandy in time to shake 
out and get ready for "Totalize." Simonds sent a 
complete armoured corps into his greatest battle 
seemingly wi thou t t es t ing tac t ics or 
communications.9 4 Again, his p lans were 
overtaken by events. 
Veteran Canadian and British armour had 
easily defeated the initial counterattack by 
Waldmuller. Fireflies had Tiger's number. Old 
hands seemed capable of taking Tiger on while 
new crews still feared the Tiger bogeyman. 
Simonds briefly tasted operational maneuver 
then lost it. The fault for a failed army-level 
breakthrough cannot be laid at the feet of one 
armoured regiment.95 
The II Corps continued to butt its head 
against Meyer's front door for one more day. 
Simonds gained a couple of pieces of tactical 
real estate, but the battle was over. The actual 
end came with the failure to reinforce 
Worthington on Hill 140. 
"Totalize" - Analysis 
The operational results of "Totalize" were a 
gain of over eight miles and the virtual 
destruction of one German infantry division. It 
was the deepest penetration made by either First 
Canadian or II British Army thus far in the 
campaign. The German forces were stretched to 
the breaking point and Crerar was poised on an 
excellent jump-off place to attack Falaise. 
Strategically, the western front, to quote von 
Kluge, "had burst."96 Patton had entered le Mans, 
80 miles due south of the Laison and the "Falaise 
pocket" had been formed. "Totalize's" tactical 
results were disappointing. Night moves for 
armour were dangerous and, one could argue, 
irresponsible. There was only the vaguest 
doctrine for a night attack by armoured divisions 
and it had not been practised since El Alamein. 
"Totalize" demanded complex phases that would 
have sorely tested the most experienced 
armoured formations; to set them upon Kitching 
and Maczek was venturesome planning. Finally, 
as Meyer noted in his personal critique, 
"Stopping to water your horses in the middle of 
a cavalry charge"97 is not maneuver warfare. 
There was no operational breakthrough, despite 
the fact that by the morning of the 8th a 
considerable gap had been created in 1 SS 
Panzer Corps. A congregation of 13 armoured 
regiments had been stopped by the equivalent 
of one. Again, a handful of Tigers rattled the 
Allied armoured force. While Bradley had 
successful ly defeated the Morta in 
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A Canadian-built Ram OP tank advancing near Cintheaux on 8 August 1944. In the background can be NAC PA 131376 
seen a burning ammunition truck, a likely casualty of the short bombing by B-l 7s of the US 8th Air Force. 
counteroffensive of four German panzer 
divisions, Crerar had been unable to crack one. 
"Totalize" was Simonds's battle. It should have 
become Crerar's battle as soon as penetration 
occurred. 
First Canadian Army was not directed with 
convincing operational skill. Both Army and 
Corps Headquar ters were mesmerized by 
Falaise. Crerar should have considered his left 
flank and the Seine. The entire eastern front of 
Normandy, from the Caen-Paris highway, to the 
Laison River, was held by Schack's 272nd 
Infantry Division. Its three regiments could not 
scrape together more than the equivalent of two 
to three rifle battalions.98 Behind Schack there 
was nothing, no panzer reserve, not even a single 
Tiger. Crerar continued to drive south where 
Meyer was being reinforced daily from 
Eberbach's panzer divisions inside the pocket." 
It would have been most interesting to see Crerar 
34 
behave like Patton and head for the Seine and 
Paris, via the shortest route. 
Directing the Corps: Simonds as 
Chairman of the Board 
While Bradley directed his two armies and Collins and Patton maneuvered their 
corps, Montgomery looked over both Dempsey's 
and Crerar's shoulders. Crerar let Simonds do 
pretty much as he liked. Simonds had enough 
to attempt to wreck a front line, but he could 
not break out - at least in the correct Soviet 
style. If he turned to his boss for help, Crerar 
could honestly say he had given him everything 
he had. There were no more tanks in the 
cupboard. Delay became embarrassing; by 9 
August, First Canadian Army was still fighting 
"The Normandy Campaign" while the 12th US 
Army Group was 16 days into "The Campaign 
for Northern France."100 
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The Corps is the hear t of operational 
maneuver; it is the first permanent planning 
structure that guides operations. Dynamic corps 
win campaigns. American doctrine stated that: 
...the attack by a corps ordinarily is a matter 
of days and not of hours...planning requires 
weeks, even months ahead of contemplated, 
probable or possible Operations...all units are 
provided with operation overlays and objectives 
designated.101 
By those s tandards Simonds's hurried 
prepara t ions for "Spring," "Totalize" and 
"Tractable" show him to be a remarkably skilled 
technical, if not tactical, planner. Conversely, it 
says little for Crerar's or Montgomery's ability to 
forecast operations. The time denied Simonds 
could have been better used to prepare divisions: 
"most important, subordinate commanders and 
their staffs, through conferences and war games, 
[should] become familiar with all plans and their 
variations."102 
American General Wade H. Haislip argued 
that the corps commander and his staff must 
have complete flexibility of thought and action 
and develop simple plans.103 Simonds had 
remarkable freedom of action and it could be 
argued that he enjoyed too much. On 26 July 
Montgomery wrote a letter of advice to Crerar on 
how to handle Simonds: "When an Army 
Commander has only one corps in his army he 
will, unless he is careful, find that he is trying to 
command that corps himself in detail. He has to 
exercise great patience and restraint."104 Bradley 
had to intervene and check Patton when, with 
impatient cavalry gusto, he countermanded or 
"adjusted" his own corps commander's orders.105 
Crerar took the advice too literally and 
evolved a hands-off policy that virtually gave 
Simonds command of the First Canadian Army 
until the end of the Falaise Campaign. Crerar's 
"Attack Doctrine" was finally published in July 
1944 and dealt in general i t ies unt i l he 
mentioned artillery. It was uninspiring.106 Crerar 
had little concept of an armoured breakthrough 
attack. He felt more comfortable in issuing a 
"Tactical Directive" for his Army which was 
nothing more than aspects of a brigade-level 
attack prepared by a gunner. Nevertheless, it 
may be argued in his defense that he had enough 
sense to let his corps commander do the 
thinking for him, even though Simonds, like 
Crerar, was learning through experimentation. 
It is easy enough to go "Simonds bashing." 
But if II Canadian Corps had achieved total 
success, what would Montgomery, or specifically, 
Dempsey, have done on 26 July? He was not 
organized to either reinforce or, more importantly, 
exploit, a Canadian breakthrough. Montgomery 
had not deployed Second British Army in 
anticipation of victory but rather in expectation 
of Canadian failure. It is unlikely Montgomery 
schemed against Crerar or Simonds, but he 
certainly failed to plan ahead.107 The tactical 
deployment of Second Army could only lead to a 
"Bluecoat" type operation, an attack on the wrong 
side of the Orne and into the wrong terrain. The 
best Dempsey could do is send a corps east via 
Caen - a long trek. Montgomery's concept of 
future operations, despite his energetic claims 
to the contrary, was short-sighted. 
There is another simpler possibility. In 
hindsight, the grand Cannae encirclement that 
was Falaise was brilliant. It was everything 
Montgomery was not. It is far more creative than 
dull tidy Montgomery who was simply sticking 
to the basic plan he laid out on 15 May.108 His 
goal was to support Bradley, to push south, not 
to encircle the Germans. Montgomery wanted to 
accomplish his stated aim - clear Brittany and 
capture a decent port: 
As to Caen, even General de Guingand didn't 
tell the truth about that. It is true there was a 
plan which showed the Americans coming up 
on the right towards the Seine while they [21st 
Army Group] swung at Caen. But that is far 
different from the decision to strike out on the 
r igh t a n d pul l qu ick ly a r o u n d . Monty 
undoubtedly intended to start the breakout on 
his front and then let the Americans come 
around as they could. He intended at first for 
Patton to spend his time cleaning up the few 
Germans in Brittany.109 
Minor Tactics 
Tactically, Simonds has and should be criticized for an inability to handle armour 
after Phase 2; this failure somehow mutated into 
official bewilderment, echoed even by Stacey, at 
the action of the BCRs. However, by 9 August, 
Crerar should have been well forward and 
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directing the pursuit from Simonds's tactical 
HQ, if not from a tank. At this stage it was a 
question of coordination with British forces and 
the creative direction of operational level 
fo rmat ions . S imonds was juggl ing the 
equivalent of two corps. He was controlling the 
largest armoured force yet available to a 
Canadian general. 
Any tactical analysis must also note the 
conduct of Kitching and Maczek. From the 
outset, both were quite unable to get anything 
out of their divisions. Frustrated directives sent 
by radio were generally ignored. Both the Polish 
and Canadian armoured brigadiers had no 
practical effect on the battle.110 "Totalize" was 
fought at the battlegroup level by lieutenant-
colonels and majors. 
"Totalize's" operational set backs - the 
decision to stop for a second bombing phase, 
the unfortunate bombing of friendly vanguards 
by 8th USAAF and finally, the inability to get 
going against scrappy but inferior opposition -
may be attributed to bad luck but the post 
mortem will find doctrinal inexperience as the 
probable cause of death. Kurt Meyer was 
unforgiving in his evaluation of "Totalize": 
British and Canadian planning was absolutely 
wi thout risk; ne i ther a rmy employed its 
armoured strength for (the job for) which it was 
created. In both armies, the tank was used, 
more or less, as an infantry support weapon. 
Armoured warfare is a matter of using given 
opportunities on the battlefield, therefore the 
Div Comd belongs on the leading combat gp, 
to see for himself, to save precious time, and 
to make lightning decisions from his moving 
tank. He, and no one else must be the driving 
force of his div.... The Brit and Cdn forces 
executed the ops in an inflexible, time wasting, 
method. Never once did "Speed" as the most 
powerful weapon of Armd Warfare, appear.111 
Meyer's comments have been sniffed at by both 
veterans and historians. This may be sour 
grapes. His qualifications to criticize "Totalize" 
are the best imaginable - he won the battle. 
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